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I. INTRODUCTION

Can the United States government enforce a warrant to compel an
American Internet service provider (“provider” or “ISP”) to surrender
a customer’s data that are stored in another country? Should it be able
to do so? This Note focuses on a case that was before the Supreme
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Court that addressed this question. 1 United States v. Microsoft,
(“Microsoft”) would have interpreted the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA” or “the Act”) 2 pertaining to when and how the government
may compel a provider of electronic communication service to disclose
customer or subscriber content information. 3 However, before the
Court made a ruling, Congress passed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas
Use of Data Act (“CLOUD Act”) as part of an omnibus bill, which
gave a legislative solution to this issue. 4 Before the CLOUD Act was
passed, courts struggled to understand and apply the SCA in a
technologically evolving world, where characterizing the “cloud” itself
was cloudy.
The framework in which courts addressed this issue was through
a territoriality lens. 5 This means that courts interpreted the application
of the SCA dependent upon notions of where data are stored and
whether US law enforcement may lawfully gain access to the data they
have a warrant for if such data are stored abroad. In short, courts framed
the issue as whether a provider must comply with an SCA warrant if
the sought-for data are stored on a server located domestically or
abroad. However, both possible answers to that issue have problematic
implications, so neither would be fully satisfactory. Congressional
action with regard to this issue was long overdue. Building off of the
CLOUD Act, this Note proposes a version of that bill that considers the
competing interests of law enforcement, users, other countries, and
technology companies, rather than only physical location.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of Fourth
Amendment protections and the SCA. Part II outlines and discusses the
appellate history of the Microsoft case. Part III analyzes the problems
of both possible outcomes of the Microsoft issue as it was framed.
Finally, Part IV discusses the most recent legislative solution to the
1. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1986).
3. Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. at 1186. For convenience, I will refer to all internet, electronic,
and cloud service providers, and other applicable providers as a “provider.”
4. The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act was incorporated into the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141 div. V, 132 Stat. 348, 1212–25
[hereinafter CLOUD Act].
5. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Microsoft I]; Matter
of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp.,
829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Microsoft II].
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SCA and proposes an optimal result to address cyberspace cases
dealing with similar predicaments in the future.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS AND THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Standards of privacy in the United States stem from the
Constitution. In particular, the Fourth Amendment protects “against
unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. 6 An
established principle in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is the
distinction between government surveillance inside versus outside of
one’s home. 7 This distinction is based on the idea that a person does
not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in public spaces, as
opposed to the home. 8 In public, police are not required to have any
“cause or order to conduct surveillance outside.” 9 In private places,
however, police must have a warrant issued “upon probable cause . . .
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” 10
The inside/outside distinction helps to “ensure[] a basic balance
of Fourth Amendment protection[s]” between a person’s privacy and
the ability of police to conduct investigations efficiently. 11 However,
this distinction becomes blurred in the context of online activity that is
neither clearly outside nor inside. On the one hand, online activity
requires the services of a third-party intermediary, the provider.12
Therefore, an Internet user does not have a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” because the Internet is a public domain not singularly

6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1010 (2010).
8. See id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Kerr, supra note 7, at 1011.
12. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209–10 (2004); United States v. Warshak,
631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“An ISP is the intermediary that makes email communication
possible. Emails must pass through an ISP’s servers to reach their intended recipient.”). For a
general definition of Internet Service Provider, see Margaret Rouse, ISP (Internet service
provider), TECHTARGET (Feb. 2006), https://searchwindevelopment.techtarget.com/definition/
ISP [https://perma.cc/GER4-AVY2] (defining an ISP as “a company that provides . . . access to
the Internet”).
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controlled by the user. 13 On the other hand, users do have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” online, because they have access to certain
spaces on the Internet that are not accessible to the public, such as
private emails, social media messaging, or other websites where a
single user login is required to access an account or other information.14
Viewing Internet use in physical terms also blurs the
inside/outside distinction. The Internet is fully contained within wires
and storage devices that a police officer could not see by chance when
in a public space. 15 In that sense, the Internet is inside. Users can opt
for such wired connections or wireless connections. 16 If users have a
wireless connection, the Internet is outside in the sense that
communications are transmitted over airwaves. Airwaves can be
“intercepted in the open” because they do not pass through private
channels. 17 Thus, the traditional inside/outside distinction viewed
purely in regards to physicality may be arbitrary depending on the type
of technology a user has installed in his or her home. 18 The result is that
the inside/outside distinction ceases to “capture the basic balance of
Fourth Amendment protection.” 19 Traditional interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment were premised on the importance of physicality
and location. 20 Although cyberspace has often been compared to the
physical realm, the reality is that the traditional physical assumptions
ingrained in the Fourth Amendment are not quite the same on the
Internet. 21 There are virtually no limits on the amount of data that can
13. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1210.
14. Id. at 1210–11; Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account: A Trade Secret Approach
to Allocating Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201, 237 (2013).
15. Id. at 1012.
16. Kerr, supra note 7, at 1012.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1013. See also Alexander Dugas Battey, Jr., Note, A Step in the Wrong Direction:
The Case for Restraining the Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications Act, 42
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 262, 267 (2016) (“[T]he possibility of electronically stored
information was unforeseeable and the Fourth Amendment’s protections traditionally extended
only to the tangible realm. Thus, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act in 1986 to
fill that gap to apply to our ‘virtual homes.’”).
21. See Voyeur Dorm, L.C. v. City of Tampa, 265 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding city
code law prohibiting adult entertainment offered to the public did not apply to company that
recorded adult entertainment at a premises because the entertainment was offered only to online
subscribers and not physically to the public); Kyllo v. United States, 121 U.S. 2038, 2043 (2001)
(“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the home’s interior that
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be stored and accessed on a device,22 and data can be automatically
stored in any number of locations across the globe. 23 To further
distance the physical world from cyberspace, users on a computer
network do not necessarily have any privacy because third parties, the
providers, own and operate the networks we all access and use. 24
In light of developing technology and fear of government
intrusions, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act in 1986.25
Congress was concerned because there were no “Federal statutory
standards to protect the privacy and security of [certain electronic]
communications.” 26 The SCA governs stored data communications and
offers network account holders “Fourth Amendment–like privacy
protections.” 27 The meat of the SCA is contained in two sections, one
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not
in general public use”) (citation omitted); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding
that officers may examine physical aspects of a cell phone but generally may not search data on
a cell phone without a warrant).
22. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“[T]he possible intrusion on privacy is not physically
limited in the same way when it comes to cell phones,” because they are essentially
“minicomputers” with an “immense storage capacity” that are materially distinguishable from
“physical realities.”); Kerr, supra note 7, at 1013 (“Traditional Fourth Amendment rules have
been crafted in light of those assumptions [physicality limits on scale and location]; the rules
generally are scale- and location-specific. Those assumptions do not hold in the Internet
environment. In a world of data, third-party services can always provide more data, and the data
can be anywhere. No limit exists on the number, size, or location of accounts, services, or data
one person can control that might contain the evidence that the government seeks.”).
23. See Kerr, supra note 7, at 1013; see also Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail
Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp, 829 F.3d 197, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2016).
24. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1209-10 (“When we use a computer network such as the
Internet, however, a user does not have a physical ‘home,’ nor really any private space at all.
Instead, a user typically has a network account consisting of a block of computer storage that is
owned by a network service provider . . . Although a user may think of that storage space as a
‘virtual home,’ in fact that ‘home’ is really just a block of ones and zeroes stored somewhere on
somebody else’s computer. This means that when we use the Internet, we communicate with
and through that remote computer to contact other computers. Our most private information ends
up being sent to private third parties and held far away on remote network servers.”).
25. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012)); see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1-2 (1986) (“When the Framers
of the Constitution acted to guard against the arbitrary use of Government power to maintain
surveillance over citizens, there were limited methods of intrusion into the ‘houses, papers, and
effects’ protected by the fourth amendment. During the intervening 200 years, development of
new methods of communication and devices for surveillance has expanded dramatically the
opportunity for such intrusions.”); Kerr, supra note 12, at 1208; Jennifer Daskal, The UnTerritoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 360-61 (2015).
26. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
27. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1212.
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limiting a provider’s voluntary disclosures and the other setting forth
when the government can compel involuntary disclosures from
providers. 28 Specifically, section 2702 “generally prohibits the
provider of a wire or electronic communication service to the public
from knowingly divulging the contents of any communications while
in electronic storage by that service to any person other than the
addressee or intended recipient” with certain enumerated exceptions.29
Section 2703 provides requirements for when the government may gain
access to contents of a stored electronic communication. 30
Whereas the “Fourth Amendment imposes restrictions on the
government’s authority to search and seize . . . , [SCA] warrants
provide the government the affirmative authorization to do so.” 31 Thus,
the SCA balances individual privacy interests with the government’s
interest in conducting investigations. Privacy protection is exemplified
by the SCA’s ability to limit providers from voluntarily disclosing
information about their customer communications or records. 32 It also
limits the “government’s ability to compel providers to disclose
information in their possession about their customers and
subscribers.” 33
The SCA also differentiates between content and noncontent
information. 34 Noncontent information, referred to as “a record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of” a provider, is
also known as “metadata” or “traffic data.” 35 Such noncontent
information is not the substance of the communication, but rather refers
to information about the message or transmission, such as names,
addresses, and length of service or transmission. 36 The SCA defines
“‘contents,’ when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, [as] includ[ing] any information concerning the

28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702-2703.
29. Id. § 2702; S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 37 (1986).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 38 (1986).
31. Daskal, supra note 25, at 333.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2702; Kerr, supra note 12, at 1213.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2703; Kerr, supra note 12, at 1212.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(c)
35. Id. § 2703(c)(1); Kerr, supra note 12, at 1227.
36. Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving
Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 485 (2016); 18 U.S.C. §
2703(c)(2).
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substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 37 Content
information, which has a higher standard of privacy protection, would
include such information as the subject line and body of an email or the
spoken message in a recording. 38 Orin Kerr, a renowned scholar in the
field of cyberspace law, defined content information as “the
communication that a person wishes to share or communicate with
another person.” 39 To analogize this in the physical world, the inside of
a sealed letter would be the content information—namely the substance
of the letter. 40 Similarly, any information written outside the envelope,
such as names and addresses, or information surrounding the
envelope’s delivery would be noncontent information. 41 Congress
afforded content information a higher degree of privacy “for reasons
that most people find intuitive: actual contents of messages naturally
implicate greater privacy concerns than information (much of it
network-generated) about those communications.” 42
The SCA contains three means for a government to compel
information—a subpoena, a court order, and a warrant—all of which
have different requirements and outcomes. 43 SCA warrants require the
highest standard of all such means to obtain disclosure under the
SCA—compliance with the procedures within the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 44 This high standard is required because a warrant
compels the service provider to disclose everything stored in a user’s
account. 45 The general requirements for obtaining a warrant under the
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (stating “the terms defined in section 2510 of this title have,
respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section”); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
38. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1228; OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S.
ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, 122–23 (2009).
39. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1228.
40. But see Russell Hsiao, Implications for the Future of Global Data Security and
Privacy: The Territorial Application of the Stored Communications Act and the Microsoft Case,
24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 215, 242 (2015) (concluding emails “are fundamentally different from
letters” because packet switching technology, which is disassembling an email and reassembling
it upon receipt, “would be roughly analogous to unsealing the letter, and sending the letter and
envelope separately, and hav[ing] it reassembled when it reaches its recipient”).
41. See Kerr, supra note 7, at 1019.
42. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1228. For Kerr’s in-depth analysis of why noncontent
information does not require higher privacy protections equivalent to content information, see
id. at 1228 n.142.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2703; Daskal, supra note 25, at 361.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(c).
45. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1223.
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require “probable cause” and an
issuance of the warrant by a magistrate judge for a government search
and seizure. 46 This “probable cause” standard positions the U.S. as
having one of the “more robust” standards of proof compared to other
nations. 47 With these considerations in mind, this Note focuses solely
on SCA warrants because of their high standard and wide scope of
disclosure. SCA warrants would presumably set the standard for other
extraterritorial applications of the SCA.
III. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF THE SCA REGARDING
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Microsoft was a case of first instance in the Supreme Court on the
issue of whether the US government could use an SCA warrant to
compel a provider to disclose data that are stored abroad. 48 The district
court in Microsoft was the first case to hear this specific issue.49
Following both Microsoft’s district court and appellate court decisions
on this issue, other courts have consistently ruled in favor of the
government and enforced SCA warrants for data stored abroad. 50
The case involves Microsoft Corporation, a provider that owns
and operates a web-based email service where account holders can
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1)
47. See Daskal, supra note 36, at 482-83 (comparing warrant requirements of the U.S. and
other countries and concluding “[t]he U.S. warrant requirement is unique . . . and more robust
than what is required in most other nations”).
48. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1186 (2018)
49. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
50. Only a handful of courts have considered the issue and discussed the appellate court’s
holding in Microsoft. These courts have criticized the holding and have declined to follow it,
instead consistently ruling in favor of the government. See e.g., In re Search Warrant No. 16960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (holding SCA warrants did not violate
the presumption against extraterritoriality and were enforceable abroad); In re Search Warrant
to Google, Inc., Mag. No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017); In re Info.
Associated with One Yahoo Email Address that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Yahoo,
Case Nos. 17-M-1234 & 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 706307 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017); In re Info.
Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com, Case No. 16-mj-757 (GMH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92601 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017); In re Search of Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as
[redacted]@gmail.com, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2017); In the Matter of Search of
Content that Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Case No. 16-mc-80263-LB, 2017 WL
1487625 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2017); In re Two Email Accounts at Google, Inc., Case No. 17-M1235, 2017 WL 2838156 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2017); In re Search Warrant Issued to Google,
Inc., 264 F. Supp. 3d 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2017); In the Matter of the Search of: Contents & Records
Relating to the Google Accounts, 18-mc-00020, 2018 WL 942301 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2018).
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send, receive, and store email messages. 51 Microsoft stores these email
messages in datacenters, which have various locations both within the
United States and abroad. 52 In order to increase network speed for users
and reduce “network latency,” or slow Internet speeds, Microsoft’s
system makes efforts to assign each account to the closest datacenter to
the user as possible. 53 Originally, Microsoft managed where account
information was stored according to the country code with which a user
registered his or her account. 54 This was an automatic process. 55 Once
an account was migrated, or moved, abroad, “all content and most
noncontent information associated with the account [was] deleted from
servers in the United States.” 56 However, following the Second
Circuit’s decision, Microsoft changed its policy so that it “now
automatically detects customers’ actual location and stores their emails
in datacenters nearby.” 57
In 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (“the district court”) upheld an SCA warrant
“authoriz[ing] the search and seizure of information associated with a
specified web-based e-mail account that is ‘stored at premises owned,
maintained, controlled, or operated by Microsoft.’” 58 The warrant
compelled Microsoft to disclose both content and noncontent
information about the account. 59 Microsoft determined that the warrant
targeted an account that was hosted in its Dublin, Ireland server, with
some noncontent information stored in US servers. 60 Microsoft
complied with the warrant insofar as producing the noncontent
information that was stored domestically, but refused to turn over the
content information stored in Ireland. 61 This refusal was accompanied
51. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2016).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 203.
55. Id.
56. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (emphasis added).
57. Brief for Respondent at 57, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018)
(No. 17-2) (citing Delivering a faster and more responsive Outlook.com, MICROSOFT (Oct. 27,
2017),
https://blogs.office.com/en-us/2017/10/27/delivering-a-faster-and-more-responsiveoutlook-com/ [https://perma.cc/MZ8Y-JT7P]).
58. Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d, at 467-68.
59. See id. at 468.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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by a motion to quash the warrant to the extent that it directed Microsoft
to produce information stored abroad. 62
The procedural history of this case exemplifies the different
stances that courts have taken when faced with extraterritoriality issues
involving SCA warrants. Extraterritoriality with regard to the reach of
the SCA is problematic because the United States has recognized a
presumption against extraterritoriality. 63 This presumption means that
“when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none, and reflect[s] the presumption that United
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” 64
The district court held that the SCA warrant was valid and did not
violate the presumption against extraterritoriality. 65 The court reasoned
that the “concerns that animate the presumption against
extraterritoriality are simply not present here” because “an SCA
warrant does not criminalize conduct taking place in a foreign country;
it does not involve the deployment of American law enforcement
personnel abroad; it does not require even the physical presence of
service provider employees at the location where data are stored.”66
The court found the language of section 2703(a) ambiguous in its
reference to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and, therefore,
found guidance in the legislative history and congressional intent.67
The court ultimately found that an SCA warrant is a “hybrid” of “part
search warrant and part subpoena” because, although the process to
obtain it is “like a search warrant,” an SCA warrant “is executed like a
subpoena in that it is served on the [provider] in possession of the
information and does not involve government agents entering the
premises of the [provider] to” conduct its search and seizure.68
Additionally, the court stated other practical reasons to support its
conclusion, such as the substantial burden on the government to
conduct investigations due to the lack of a requirement for the provider
to verify information as well as the inconvenience and inefficiency of
62. Id.
63. Id. at 475.
64. Id. (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) and
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
65. Id. at 477.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 470-71.
68. Id. at 471.

2018] EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF US ACCESS TO DATA 193
pursing an alternative diplomatic means called Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (“MLAT ”). 69
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court, holding that the SCA warrant did violate the
presumption against extraterritoriality, so Microsoft would not have to
turn over its customer’s content stored abroad. 70 The Second Circuit
reasoned that if “Congress intends a law to apply extraterritorially, it
gives an ‘affirmative indication’ of that intent,” whereas Congress gave
no such express indication in the SCA. 71 Indeed, the Second Circuit
emphasized that it is a presumption against extraterritoriality, and
whether or not Congress intended to limit the statute to only domestic
application is irrelevant without some explicit agreement to its
application abroad. 72 The court found further guidance in the statute’s
language and its use of the term of art “warrant,” which “is traditionally
moored to privacy concepts applied within the territory of the United
States.” 73 The use of the term “warrant” was significant and purposeful,
as was the use of other terms in the SCA, such as “subpoena.” 74 There
is no subpoena-warrant hybrid as the lower court found, but rather an
intentional use of each word. 75 Finally, the court also noted the
legislative history and its focus on privacy protection as well as its
silence as to the citizenship and location of a person. 76 In a practical
sense, Microsoft would have to interact with the Dublin datacenter and
this could threaten values of state sovereignty and autonomy, which are
already provided for through an albeit slow, but recognized MLAT
process. 77
In 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the
Microsoft case. 78 However, the case became moot in April 2018
because Congress enacted, and the President signed into law, the
69. Id. at 474. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
70. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016).
71. Id. at 211 (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010)).
72. See id.
73. Id. at 212.
74. See id. at 212–14.
75. Id. at 214.
76. Id. at 219–20.
77. Id. at 220–21.
78. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (order granting
certiorari).
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CLOUD Act, which amended the SCA to address the extraterritoriality
issue. 79
IV. PROBLEMATIC EFFECTS OF AN EXTRATERRITORIAL
FRAMEWORK
Before addressing the amending CLOUD Act, it is important to
first understand the SCA itself and what effects could result from
applying it in favor of enforcing or not enforcing the SCA warrant
extraterritorially. Microsoft is just one example of how difficult it is to
apply the SCA to modern, global providers. Ultimately, neither
outcome of the lower Microsoft decisions is particularly satisfactory
because of the blanket applications and resulting shortcomings of each
approach. Microsoft itself even acknowledges that “either
interpretation will inevitably yield some gap in coverage in the digital
era.” 80
A. Consequences if the government may obtain data stored abroad
via the SCA
One outcome of an extraterritorial framework provides that the
government may compel US providers to disclose electronic
communications within the providers’ control that are stored abroad.
Such a scenario would result in three main problems. First, complying
with an SCA warrant may lead to a violation of a foreign country’s law.
Second, there would be heightened fears of US privacy intrusion
abroad resulting in economic burdens for providers. Finally, foreign
countries may enact data localization measures, which would shift
business from the U.S. to foreign data storage companies.
One of the largest concerns about allowing the government access
to data stored abroad via an SCA warrant is the international effect.
Different providers utilize different technology when it comes to
storing their users’ data. For example,
Google user data—such as an email, or an e-mail attachment—is
not stored as one single, cohesive digital file; instead, Google
stores individual data files in multiple data “shards,” each separate
shard being stored in separate locations around the world. And,
79. Id. at 1187-88.
80. Brief for Respondent at 32, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (advocating
for Congress to legislate but insisting that, until then, the Court must stick to the SCA as it is
currently written).
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Google cannot even determine where its separate data shards are
stored around the world at any given time; and, even if one shard
were to stay in one place, without all of the shards being collected
and put together at once to form the actual digital file, each shard
alone is a useless piece of coded gibberish. Of course, each shard
might move instantaneously to somewhere else; and then to
somewhere else; and so on, and so forth. 81

Therefore, certain technology may make “it uncertain which
foreign country’s sovereignty would be implicated.” 82 Even if a
specific country is implicated, as Ireland is in the Microsoft case83,
there are potential conflict of laws issues that arise. Microsoft “presents
a potential conflict of law between the United States and the European
Union.” 84 Refusing to comply with an SCA warrant “could lead to a
contempt of court charge” in the United States. 85 Meanwhile,
unilaterally seizing data of an EU citizen without first obtaining
consent of Ireland, or the country involved, would violate EU data
protection laws. 86
Jennifer Daskal, a scholar who specializes in cyberspace law,
noted that a complicating fact is that the SCA itself is a blocking
statute, 87 which “prohibit[s] providers that do business in their
jurisdiction from responding to foreign-based requests for such data,
and instead require[s] the exercise of formal government-togovernment requests for data.” 88 The SCA consequently prohibits USbased providers from responding to properly executed foreign
government requests for the content of stored communications even if
81. In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 724 (E.D. Pa.
2017).
82. Id. at 723.
83. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
84. Battey, supra note 20, at 282. But see Reply Brief for the United States at 20–22,
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (arguing that Microsoft complied with SCA
warrants seeking data stored abroad in the past without incident and SCA warrants do “not
violate any individual nation’s laws”).
85. Battey, supra note 20, at 282.
86. Id. at 286 (concluding an SCA warrant would violate the E.U. Data Protection
Directive).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-(b) (2018) prohibits the voluntary disclosure of electronic
communications “to any governmental entity” with certain exceptions. However, a
“governmental entity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4) as “a department or agency of the United
States or any State or political subdivision thereof.” See Daskal, supra note 36, at 491 n.62.
88. Daskal, supra note 36, at 490.
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a foreign government “is seeking the data of one of its own citizens in
connection with the investigation of a local crime.” 89 Daskal also noted
that a government win “would set a dangerous precedent, allowing
governments to reach data across borders without regard to the
sovereign interests of other states . . . [consequently] threaten[ing]
privacy on a global scale.” 90 Therefore, even if no current laws would
be violated, a government win could be a model for other countries to
enact similar laws. 91 If that were the case, a US-based provider would
be prohibited from disclosing information under the SCA’s current
blocking provisions, while simultaneously violating a foreign country’s
laws modeled after the SCA. 92 Such a seizure disregards efforts for
international police cooperation and, instead, positions US control and
regulation of data stored abroad above another country’s interest in
maintaining control over such data within its own borders. 93
The United States argued that enforcement of the SCA warrant in
the Microsoft case would still respect its international obligations,
citing the Budapest Convention and arguments specifically directed at
Ireland. 94 The validity and gravity of these international concerns is not
yet clear. However, the probability of a negative international reaction
appears imminent, at least to some degree.
A second problem is, following Edward Snowden’s
whistleblowing of widespread government surveillance, there will be
heightened fears of U.S. privacy intrusion if the government can
enforce SCA warrants for data stored abroad. 95 As previously noted,
allowing such enforcement abroad could “establish a dangerous
89. Id. at 491.
90. Jennifer Daskal, There’s No Good Decision in the Next Big Privacy Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/opinion/data-abroad-privacy-court.html.
91. See Jennifer Daskal, Symposium: Justices Can, and Should, Write Nuanced Ruling to
Balance Competing Interests, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/
02/symposium-justices-can-write-nuanced-ruling-balance-competing-interests/
[https://perma.cc/LX9B-W8S2].
92. Id.
93. See Daskal, supra note 25, at 379.
94. See Brief for Petitioner at 46–52, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186
(2017) (No. 17-2).
95. Ned Schultheis, Warrants in the Clouds: How Extraterritorial Application of the Stored
Communications Act Threatens the United States’ Cloud Storage Industry, 9 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 661, 663 (2015); Brief for Respondent at 57–58, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct.
1186 (No. 17-2); David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance:
The FAA and Beyond, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 377, 383 (2016).
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precedent under which nations can unilaterally––without agreed-upon
substantive or procedural standards––compel the production of data
located anywhere in the world simply by asserting jurisdiction over the
company controlling the data.” 96 This precedent also would “arguably
justif[y] any country in the world with jurisdiction over any provider
(including US-based providers) from compelling, according to their
own standards, access to sought-after data.” 97 However, Microsoft
pointed out an ironic result from a government win. Since the
government’s theory in Microsoft is that the focus of the SCA is
disclosure, as opposed to storage, “[i]t would leave U.S. citizens’ U.S.stored communications unprotected, so long as they were disclosed
overseas.” 98 It could also “facilitate corporate espionage” by allowing
foreign countries “to obtain proprietary business information stored”
abroad. 99
Ultimately, the United States would be announcing that its law
enforcement power reaches across the globe so that it can access data
stored abroad so long as it is held by a US-based provider. 100 The
effects of this law enforcement power would lead to “heighten[ed] fears
of U.S. privacy intrusion both at home and [abroad].” 101 Such fears
would burden American providers “to interpret unclear and dated
congressional legislation and attempt to construct a coherent and
precise compliance policy for their business to assure certain privacy
protections to their customers without violating domestic or
international law.” 102 Consequently, American providers would suffer
from lost revenue due to fears of privacy intrusion. 103

96. Daskal, supra note 25, at 397.
97. Daskal, supra note 36, at 490.
98. Brief for Respondent at 12, 21, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (emphasis
added).
99. Andrew Pincus, Why is the U.S. government trying to help Vladimir Putin access
information stored in the United States?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 9, 2018, 2:05 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/02/symposium-u-s-government-trying-help-vladimir-putinaccess-information-stored-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/JRL9-MNNV].
100. Although the US government’s power still has constitutional constraints, its authority
would be expanded if the government could bypass the MLAT process and obtain data stored
abroad via SCA warrants without any input of foreign nations. See Schultheis, supra note 95, at
691.
101. Id. at 663.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 663–64.

198

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:1

In fact, providers have already begun to feel the negative
economic effects. For example, in the wake of Snowden’s
whistleblowing, the German government ended its contract with
Verizon, and the Brazilian government announced it would not renew
its license agreement with Microsoft. 104 Also, original reports
estimated that cloud computing providers could lose anywhere from
US$22 billion 105 to as much as US$180 billion in revenue in the years
following the Snowden revelations. 106 However, a more recent
Forrester survey revealed that losses may only amount to US$47 billion
for the period from 2014 to 2016, which was lower than initially
predicted, but still significant. 107 Microsoft contended that the
multibillion-dollar US cloud computing industry is built on the trust of
its customers, and a government win would eliminate that trust,
seriously damaging those providers. 108
Foreign governments may also react to a government win in the
Microsoft case by enacting data localization laws that would likely be
directed towards those nations’ own citizens. 109 Such laws would
require nationals to “store [their] data with locally-based providers so
as to ensure that the data [are] subject [only] to that nation’s
jurisdiction.” 110 Data localization efforts operate when an individual or
government removes their business from US providers to local ISPs
because that may be the only safeguard against actual or perceived US
intrusion into data stored abroad, even if the account holder of such
data is a non-US citizen living abroad. 111 Russia, for example, already
enacted a data localization measure in 2015, which “requir[es] Internet
104. Battey, supra note 20, at 287.
105. Daniel Castro, How Much Will PRISM Cost the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry?,
The INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Aug. 2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloudcomputing-costs.pdf?_ga=2.92692253.1254667291.1515781499-1904554765.1515781499
[https://perma.cc/J6VK-9CM7].
106. Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowdenhurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html.
107. Ed Ferrara, Government Spying Will Cost U.S. Vendors Fewer Billions Than Initial
Estimates, FORRESTER (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.forrester.com/report/Government+Spying+
Will+Cost+US+Vendors+Fewer+Billions+Than+Initial+Estimates/-/E-RES122149
[https://perma.cc/73BH-HQLE].
108. Brief for Respondent at 57–58, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186
(2018) (No. 17-2).
109. See Daskal, supra note 25, at 392.
110. Id.
111. See Battey, supra note 20, at 287.
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companies to locate their computer servers that contain personal
information on Russian citizens within [Russia’s] borders.”112
Additionally, “allowing governments to reach data across borders
without regard to the sovereign interests of other states” would
“threaten privacy on a global scale.” 113 Other governments may follow
the United States’ example and “[assert] the same authority,”
conceivably even as retribution. 114
Whether or not law enforcement’s access to data stored abroad
would be an intrusion, such data localization laws would, nevertheless,
act as a nation’s assertion of sovereignty. 115 A government win could
lay the foundation for these laws simply due to tension. 116 This fear
may or may not be justified. Still, fear will simply lead to global
isolation, at least with regard to Internet services, handicapping
providers from growing and users from getting competitive online
services. 117 Although a government win would seem to aid in law
enforcement efforts to conduct investigations that transcend U.S.
borders, an ironic consequence may actually ensue. 118 If data
localization movements succeed, law enforcement’s access to
extraterritorial data will actually be compromised if data ends up in the
hands of foreign providers. 119 Data localization laws may also,
however, develop as a response to a Microsoft win, as will be discussed
in the following section. 120
The foregoing concerns highlight the potentially unappealing
outcomes of interpreting SCA warrants as allowing the government to
obtain content data that are stored outside US borders. These concerns
are neither completely comprehensive nor actually imminent, as there
may be other consequences not yet taken into account or they may be
mitigated or simply not materialize as predicted. Nevertheless, they
would have appeared to present a strong possibility of occurring.
112. Hsiao, supra note 40, at 219.
113. Daskal, supra note 90.
114. Id.
115. See Daskal, supra note 36, at 476–78; Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 21, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 172); Schultheis, supra note 95, at 663 (“[D]ata localization movements [may be enacted] in the
hopes of sheltering customers from the expansive jurisdictional reach of the SCA warrant.”).
116. Hsiao, supra note 40, at 218–19.
117. See Daskal, supra note 36, at 478; Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 22, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2).
118. See Daskal, supra note 25, at 393.
119. Id.
120. See infra Part IV.B.
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B. Consequences if the government may not compel ISPs to disclose
data stored abroad
The other outcome of an extraterritorial framework provides that
the government may not compel US service providers to disclose
electronic communications within the providers’ control that are stored
outside the borders of the United States. This circumstance would
produce its own set of problems. First, whether an SCA warrant may
compel stored data abroad could be somewhat arbitrary, depending on
a provider’s business decision about where to store data. Second, it
would burden law enforcement. And lastly, it may also fuel a kind of
data localization movement.
One of the more disturbing effects of a Microsoft win would result
in a troubling dependence upon happenstance. As Daskal aptly puts it,
unlike tangible property,
we delegate large quantities of our digital property to the control
of others. Vast quantities of electronic data are now held, or
otherwise controlled, by third parties, including ISPs, cloud
service providers, and companies that maintain and operate the
fiber-optic cables that make up the Internet’s backbone. Moreover,
it is the third party, not the user, that generally makes the critical
decisions about the path by which data travels or where it is stored.
It is also the third party, not the user, that is often called on by
government officials to collect and produce the sought-after
data. 121

Users generally cannot dictate where or how their data are stored
or moved. 122 Rather, the third-party provider controls the data to
execute its own business decisions. 123 Such decisions may promote, for

121. Daskal, supra note 25, at 377.
122. Id. at 378.
123. Id. at 377.
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instance, obtaining efficient Internet speeds and reducing network
latency, 124 or they may aim for “the most cost-effective” solution. 125
Reliance on the location of data gives a provider immense power
by allowing it to circumvent law enforcement’s access to certain
data. 126 By migrating subscriber data to datacenters it builds abroad,
the provider could protect its subscribers from the reach of US law
enforcement. 127 Another arbitrary means of circumvention occurs
when a provider “move[s] data all over the world, sometimes breaking
it into ‘shards’ so that different portions of a single email account may
be stored in multiple countries at any one moment.” 128 Google engages
in such a technique, whereby it “automatically moves data from one
location on Google’s network to another as frequently as needed to
optimize for performance, reliability, and other efficiencies.”129
Google’s sharding method also makes it “possible that the network will
change the location of data between the time when the legal process is
sought and when it is served.” 130 Indeed, “Google’s compliance with a
Section 2703 warrant would depend on the happenstance of where the
data [are] located at the precise moment when the warrant is served or
the provider accesses its network” 131 It therefore becomes extremely
difficult to apply Microsoft’s data location theory to other ISPs that
have different methods for storing data. On the other hand, the Supreme
124. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2016). See Daskal, supra note 25, at 390; Brief for
51 Computer Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 17-2) (“While network latency is often measured
in fractions of a second, these seemingly infinitesimal delays have dramatic effects. One study
found, for example, ‘that a half- second delay causes a 20 percent drop in traffic on Google, and
a one tenth of a second delay can lower Amazon’s sales by 1 percent’”) (citing David Strom,
Layers of Latency: Cloud Complexity and Performance, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/2012/09/layers-of-latency/ [https://perma.cc/NA3C-WHGN]).
125. Daskal, supra note 25, at 390.
126. Brief for Petitioner at 15, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2017)
(No. 17-2).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp.3d 708, 712 (E.D. Pa.
2017), aff’d, 275 F. Supp. 3d 605 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
130. Id. But see Brief for Respondent at 59–60, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 172) (arguing that Google’s architecture still renders data as having an ascertainable physical
location, but Google was unable, in one case, to confirm the location of certain targeted
communications) (citing Hearing Transcript 27, 40, In re Search of Content Stored at Premises
Controlled by Google Inc., No. 16-80263 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017)).
131. Brief for Petitioner at 43, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2).
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Court could have ruled on the specific facts of the Microsoft case and
leave the issue open with regard to providers utilizing other data storage
technologies, such as Google’s.
Even Microsoft’s former means of data storage were somewhat
arbitrary because Microsoft’s system used an automated process that
depended upon information a subscriber provided, such as his or her
“country code.” 132 Besides Google and Microsoft, “some providers
may not even be able to determine whether they currently store the
requested data in the United States or abroad.” 133 Although large
providers may use automated processes, they still retain control and
“may also have business incentives––based on customer demand––to
move data to locations where cooperation with U.S. law enforcement
is minimal, thus creating significant barriers for law enforcement
agents investigating crimes.” 134
The next main problem pertains to burdening law enforcement. A
Microsoft win would result in difficulty in conducting criminal
investigations if law enforcement cannot obtain data that are stored
abroad but maintained by a domestic provider. 135 Simply put, law
enforcement would have to conduct investigations with less
information. In our modernized world in which data contain a
substantial amount of information, including evidence pertinent to
criminal investigations, Microsoft’s data location theory would create
an “insurmountable barrier” to enforcing the law. 136 As a result, law

132. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp, 829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016). Unless manipulation occurs, this is no longer
applicable to Microsoft’s situation following its recent change in its data storage policy. See
Brief for Respondent at 57, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (citing Delivering a
faster and more responsive Outlook.com, MICROSOFT (Oct. 27, 2017), https://blogs.office.com/
en-us/2017/10/27/delivering-a-faster-and-more-responsive-outlook-com/
[https://perma.cc/MZ8Y-JT7P]).
133. Brief for Petitioner at 44, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2).
134. Daskal, supra note 25, at 390. But see Brief for Respondent at 56, Microsoft Corp.,
138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2) (contending that Microsoft’s decisions about where to store data was
not based on evading or hampering law enforcement, but rather were based on reducing network
latency).
135. See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corp, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Brief for Petitioner at 41–45,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2017) (No. 17-2).
136. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2).
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enforcement would need to use diplomatic means to conduct
investigations via the use of MLATs. 137
An MLAT is an international agreement that allows for
cooperation in criminal investigations and other related matters. 138 The
MLAT process is extremely slow and complicated, and it begins with
a formal request from law enforcement officials to another country for
assistance and cooperation from that country with domestic law
enforcement. 139
The main problems surrounding MLATs stem from their
procedures. 140 They are very slow and not universal, and MLAT
requests can also be denied. 141 Typically, the entire MLAT process is
estimated to last ten months or longer, depending in part on the number
of requests. 142 Since 2000, MLAT requests have “increased nearly 85%
and the number of requests for computer records has increased over
1000%.” 143 MLATs “require the data to be held in a relatively fixed
location, and in a location known to the United States.” 144 This is
extremely problematic and futile for data that move rapidly, such as
that maintained by Google. MLATs are also not universal because the
U.S. does not have an MLAT with every country in the world. 145 In the
absence of an MLAT or executive agreement, Letters Rogatory could
be another means to obtain cross-border assistance, but the entire
process may take a year or more and has similar shortcomings as

137. See Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 474–75; Brief for Petitioner at 44–45, Microsoft
Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2).
138. See 2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REP.: MONEY
LAUNDERING AND FIN. CRIMES 20 (Mar. 2012), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/185866.pdf [https://perma.cc/C98T-LZWC].
139. For an overview of a typical MLAT process, see Andrew Keane Woods, Against
Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 749 (2016).
140. See id. at 748–51.
141. Brief for Petitioner at 44–45, Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2); Daskal, supra
note 25, at 393–94.
142. Id. See Daskal, supra note 25, at 393–94; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation
Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 409 (2014) (“[The MLAT] process
generally remains slow and laborious, as it requires the cooperation of two governments and one
of those governments may not prioritize the case as highly as the other.”).
143. CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PERFORMANCE BUDGET: FY 2017 PRESIDENT’S
BUDGET 23 (2016), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/820926/download [https://perma.cc/
3AGB-YUCE].
144. Daskal, supra note 90.
145. See 2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 138, at 20; Daskal, supra note 25, at 394.
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MLATs. 146 A final problem with the MLAT process is that an MLAT
request may still be denied. 147 Therefore, such alternative measures to
obtain stored data abroad are not currently the most efficient channels
without some future legislative reform.
Furthermore, users can easily exacerbate the burden on law
enforcement by manipulating the system, depending upon which
provider they use, to ensure their data are stored abroad in order to
evade law enforcement. 148 Users may subscribe to companies that store
data outside the United States and in countries “unwilling, or perhaps
technologically unable, to cooperate with official government-togovernment requests for electronic evidence.” 149 Another possible
means of circumvention is for a user to simply input false information
when signing up for an account or otherwise manipulating one’s IP
address to trick the provider’s system to attribute the user’s location to
another country and, consequently, store that user’s data abroad.150
Moreover, a provider “is under no obligation to verify the information
provided by a customer at the time an e-mail account is opened.”151
Microsoft subscribers, for example, were able to exploit the system
using such methods, at least before its recent policy change. 152
Ultimately, local and national security would also suffer if
providers reduce cooperation with law enforcement in order to promote
their own subscribers’ interests and maintain a profitable business.153
Barriers to law enforcement investigations “impinge[] on the ability to
fight and solve crime,” and this is likely to increase “as more and more

146. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LETTERS ROGATORY, CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL 275,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-275-letters-rogatory [http://perma.cc/
R5DV-YHCZ]. Contra Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016) (referencing district court’s
concerns that “for countries with which it has not signed an MLAT, the United States has no
formal tools with which to obtain assistance in conducting law enforcement searches abroad”).
147. See In re A Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
148. Daskal, supra note 25, at 390.
149. Id.
150. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2). See Roland
Waddilove, How to use a VPN, TECH ADVISOR (June 20, 2018), https://www.techadvisor.co.uk/
how-to/internet/how-use-vpn-3466190/ [https://perma.cc/3HDM-B7RT] (explaining Virtual
Private Networks and how they can “make it appear as if [a user is] located in another country”).
151. Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 474.
152. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2).
153. See Daskal, supra note 25, at 390.

2018] EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF US ACCESS TO DATA 205
evidence becomes digitalized, even in run-of-the-mill local crimes.”154
On a national level, national security combating terrorism would also
be at risk, especially considering the global nature of modern
terrorism. 155 In fact, following the Second Circuit’s decision, law
enforcement divisions have already experienced some difficulties in
investigations. 156
A final overarching issue with a Microsoft win would be that it
may also fuel data localization movements. A Microsoft win with such
an outcome would seem almost irreconcilable with a government win:
How could both possible outcomes of the Microsoft decision lead to
the same problem? There are nuances to both data localization
movements that slightly differentiate them, that help address this
conundrum. Unlike data localization movements previously
described, 157 movements responding to a Microsoft win would target
providers, rather than nationals, and regulate server location, rather
than provider location. 158 If the physical location of a server determines
law enforcement’s access to stored data, nations mandating data
localization laws would “require data collecting Internet companies to
store the collected data on servers physically located within [their own]
country.” 159
Some providers that aim to protect their users and avoid the grasp
of US law enforcement might even voluntarily migrate their stored data
to a location abroad––data localization initiated by a provider itself
rather than a nation’s government. 160 Even though there are differences
between these data localization movements, some of the effects are the
154. Daskal, supra note 36, at 480.
155. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, 41, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2).
156. See Benjamin Battles, Business decisions should not control whether law
enforcement can investigate local crimes, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 6, 2018, 10:25 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/02/symposium-business-decisions-not-control-whether-lawenforcement-can-investigate-local-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/9Z5C-CLHP] (citing impeded
investigations involving crimes against minors in Vermont, Utah, and California); Data Stored
Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital Era: Statement Before
the Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5-6 (2017) (statement of Richard W. Downing, Acting
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.) [hereinafter Downing Statement] (citing several examples of
impeded investigations).
157. See supra Part III.A.
158. See generally Daskal, supra note 25, at 392 (differentiating data localization
movements).
159. Hsiao, supra note 40, at 219. Accord Woods, supra note 139, at 751.
160. See Daskal, supra note 36, at 488.
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same, such as efficiency costs affecting network speeds and monetary
costs on providers that would spread to users. 161 Apple, for instance,
recently announced that it will begin to store iCloud account
information of its Chinese subscribers in China as part of a joint venture
with a Chinese partner. 162 This is a result of new data localization laws
requiring “cloud services offered to Chinese citizens [to] be operated
by Chinese companies and that the data be stored in China.” 163 Chinese
officials will be able to use their own legal system to get access to
Apple’s Chinese subscriber information instead of going to US courts.
This raises concerns about potential human rights abuses, such as the
Chinese government using this more easily accessible information to
track down dissidents. 164
Localization efforts could also theoretically drive law
enforcement officers to “resort to other, less wholesome tactics to get
access” to data stored abroad. 165 For example, such tactics may include
raiding the offices of providers and even surveilling a nation’s own
citizens. 166 Other adverse implications involve “the innovative
potential of the Internet and . . . privacy rights of both American and
foreign-based users.” 167 Specifically, Americans with data stored
abroad will be at risk for privacy intrusions if that nation does not have
as high a standard as probable cause in obtaining a lawful warrant.168
Small start-ups may also get priced out of the international market if
foreign nations with localization laws source only from domestic
ISPs. 169

161. See Woods, supra note 139, at 752–53.
162. Stephen Nellis & Cate Cadell, Apple moves to store iCloud keys in China, raising
human rights fears, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2018, 12:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-apple-icloud-insight/apple-moves-to-store-icloud-keys-in-china-raising-human-rightsfears-idUSKCN1G8060 [https://perma.cc/67KS-7H3K].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Woods, supra note 139, at 751.
166. Id. at 751, 753.
167. See Daskal, supra note 36, at 488.
168. Id.
169. Daskal, supra note 90.
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V. PROPOSAL
The previous discussion demonstrates the difficulty posed by
Microsoft and the state of the law before passage of the CLOUD Act. 170
Fortunately, Congress has recently passed legislation that specifically
addresses the extraterritoriality problems. Part V discusses the
challenges to the extraterritorial framework as well as the CLOUD Act
as a solution.
A. The Difficulty of Framing Data Territorially
The debate about whether data has features of territoriality and
can be subject to rules of territoriality largely depends on how one
describes data’s characteristics. On the one hand, data are territorial and
have features of both intangible assets (like intellectual property,
investments, and debts) and physical assets. 171 Accordingly, courts
“have at least two lines of inquiry for determining when a state ought
to be able to properly assert jurisdiction over data in the cloud”: it can
properly apply existing case law dealing with either intangible or
physical assets to data. 172 The other side of the debate is more
persuasive, finding that data have unique characteristics that “raise
fundamental challenges to territoriality doctrine.” 173 Declaring that
data can be assigned to a physical location is arbitrary because data
move frequently, and sometimes in pieces, depending on the providers’
algorithms and business decisions, and typically without any consent
or even awareness on behalf of the user. 174 Although it would be
convenient, the concept of data simply is an exceptional phenomenon
and should be treated according to its own characteristics––not the
characteristics of anything else.
Framing the issue of the government’s ability to access data stored
abroad in territorial terms brings with it practical difficulties as well as
negative results, either way. One commentator succinctly pointed out
some of these issues:
170. See supra Parts III–IV.
171. See Woods, supra note 139, at 734–35, 756–63 (arguing that data does not have novel
features, but instead is inherently territorial, and courts may treat it as an intangible asset or as a
physical object).
172. Id. at 763.
173. Daskal, supra note 25, at 378.
174. See id. at 367, 373.
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Territorial rules aspire to certainty, but technology makes it harder
to define “territoriality” in a consistent and predictable way.
Technology weakens territoriality as a proxy for policy goals
because data often move in ways that are disconnected with the
interests of users and lawmakers. Technology makes it easier for
public and private actors to circumvent territorial rules (often
without detection), thus interfering with the existing allocation of
policymaking authority. 175

B. Building on the CLOUD Act
Microsoft illustrates the difficulties that come with outdated laws
that vaguely address an issue. In its unamended state, the SCA would
not give a satisfactory answer to the question of whether providers must
comply with SCA warrants when law enforcement seeks data stored
abroad. 176 Shortly before the Microsoft I decision came out, Microsoft
wrote in a blog post that having “[c]learer rules for access to data
175. Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality, Technology, and National Security, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. 45, 46 (2016).
176. Orin Kerr proposed an alternative to applying the SCA to Microsoft. Kerr argues that
Microsoft should have made its challenge under the All Writs Act instead of the SCA. Orin Kerr,
Microsoft Challenged the Wrong Law. Now What?, LAWFARE (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/microsoft-challenged-wrong-law-now-what
[https://perma.cc/48DF-D9FY]. He analogizes the Microsoft situation as analogous to United
States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held that
federal courts may issue assistance orders under the authority of the All Writs Act to compel a
communications provider, “as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate” a warrant. An
AWA framework would provide better results, Kerr asserts, because it would avoid the two poor
results stemming from Microsoft’s current SCA framework. Kerr, supra note 176. Instead, the
AWA would empower judges to use their discretion and create more flexible judge-made rules,
leading to more sensible outcomes. Id.
Jennifer Daskal directly challenges Kerr’s theory. See Jennifer Daskal, Why Microsoft
Challenged the Right Law: A Response to Orin Kerr, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/48907/microsoft-challenged-law-response-orin-kerr/
[https://perma.cc/ZSZ4-D4EC]. Daskal argues that the SCA is the key issue, not the AWA. The
government, Microsoft, and “every judge that has looked at the issue” have framed it as an SCA
case. Daskal notes that the SCA deals with “the kind of compelled disclosure warrants at issue
in the case” and that Kerr relies on pre-SCA cases that are distinguishable from the
circumstances at play in Microsoft. Id. The AWA “is a residual source of authority to issue writs
that are not otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular
issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.” Carlisle v. United
States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (quoting Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States
Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985)). Finally, Daskal states that the AWA framework still
begs the question of whether “this a territorial or extraterritorial exercise of the government’s
warrant authority.” Id. I agree with Daskal that the SCA, rather than the AWA, applies in
Microsoft.
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internationally would help open borders and enable companies to host
services and data in one country for citizens in another.” 177 The need
for a bright-line rule was evident. Microsoft summarily pointed out that
Congress should legislate and “rewrite the statute to strike a new,
twenty-first century balance between law-enforcement interests, our
relations with foreign nations, the privacy of our citizens, and the
competitiveness of our technology industry,” 178 a belief that the
government also shares, albeit with a much stronger emphasis on lawenforcement interests. 179
On February 6, 2018, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced a bill to
directly address the issue, and it is aptly entitled the CLOUD Act.180
This bipartisan bill is supported both by the US Department of Justice
and large technology companies, including Microsoft. 181 During his
introduction of the bill, Senator Hatch acknowledged the need to
legislate, noting the negative consequences of either outcome of
Microsoft. 182 Specifically, he stated that “[n]o matter how the Court
177. Time for an international convention on government access to data, MICROSOFT
CORP. BLOGS (Jan. 20, 2014), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/01/20/time-foran-international-convention-on-government-access-to-data/ [https://perma.cc/5CEW-CT5E].
178. Brief for Respondent at 14, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018)
(No. 17-2).
179. The Department of Justice announced six principles that it thinks should be
implemented in a new solution. Downing Statement, supra note 156, at 9–10. The principles are
as follows: (1) “a solution must permit law enforcement investigators effectively to obtain digital
evidence without undue delay”; (2) “reliance solely on the MLA[T] process cannot be the
solution”; (3) “a solution cannot grant foreign governments a veto authority over U.S. criminal
investigations,” with China and Russia in mind; (4) “a solution must take into account the reality
that investigators often will not know the identity, nationality, or location of the account holder”;
(5) “a solution should avoid creating an incentive for other countries to create ‘data localization’
laws”; and (6) “a solution should not grant benefits or protections to foreigners that are not also
granted to U.S. citizens and residents.” Id.
180. CLOUD Act.
181. Jennifer Daskal, Justices can, and should, write nuanced ruling to balance competing
interests, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 7, 2018, 10:35 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/02/
symposium-justices-can-write-nuanced-ruling-balance-competing-interests/
[https://perma.cc/4Y2A-FDR8]. See Letter from Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, & Oath
to Sens. Orinn Hatch, Christopher Coons, Lindsey Graham, & Sheldon Whitehouse (Feb. 6,
2018),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/datalaw/wp-content/uploads/sites/149/2018/02/TechCompanies-Letter-of-Support-for-Senate-CLOUD-Act-020618.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D6DV5F2] [hereinafter Company Letter of Support].
182. Press Release, Orrin Hatch, Hatch Previews CLOUD Act: Legislation to Solve the
Problem of Cross-Border Data Requests, (Feb. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Press Release, Orrin Hatch],
https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/2/hatch-previews-cloud-act-legislationto-solve-the-problem-of-cross-border-data-requests [https://perma.cc/8BMZ-VGTS].
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rules . . . problems will remain. Either law enforcement will lack the
ability to obtain in a timely manner email and documents in the cloud
that are stored overseas, or providers will find themselves caught
between conflicting domestic and foreign laws.” 183 Congress passed
the CLOUD Act on March 23, 2018. 184 Although not without some
concerns, the CLOUD Act improves upon the status quo—an outdated
statute that does not clearly address the Microsoft issue and would lead
to one of two negative outcomes. 185
The CLOUD Act has two main parts. 186 The first part addresses
the Microsoft issue head on, stating that a provider must comply with
SCA warrants if the information sought is “within such provider’s
possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such
communication, record, or other information is located within or
outside of the United States.” 187 This provision makes it the default for
a provider to comply with government requests for data stored abroad.
There is an exception to the default, which is for a provider to file a
motion to quash or modify if, in a particular instance, the provider
reasonably believes the target of the government request is a customer
or subscriber who “is not a United States person and does not reside in
the United States” and, secondly, “that the required disclosure would
cause the provider to violate the laws of a qualifying foreign
government,” which is a government with which the United States has
an executive agreement. 188 The government is given an opportunity to
respond and the court may modify or quash if it finds the disclosure
would violate the foreign country’s law, if the target is not a US citizen
or resident, and if it would be in the interests of justice. 189 The last
factor requires the court to conduct a comity analysis, which may be
helpful guidance for a court, but it may also be more of a “symbolic
gesture” of good will towards other countries. 190
183. Id.
184. CLOUD Act, 1212.
185. See supra Parts III-IV.
186. Sen. Hatch conceptualizes the bill has having four key components. For his
breakdown of the bill, see Press Release, Orinn Hatch, supra note 182.
187. CLOUD Act § 103(a)(1).
188. CLOUD Act § 103(b).
189. Id.
190. Andrew Keane Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A Welcome Legislative Fix
for Cross-Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://lawfareblog.com/cloud-actwelcome-legislative-fix-cross-border-data-problems
[https://perma.cc/ZK6X-CTVQ]
(“[C]ourts were already free under the common law to conduct a comity analysis in thinking
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The second main part of the CLOUD Act lifts the blocking
provisions of the SCA, meaning that ISPs are permitted to comply with
certain foreign government requests for data if an executive agreement
between the United States and that country exists. 191 Under the current
SCA, foreign governments cannot directly request data from US-based
providers, but must instead go through diplomatic channels,
“enlist[ing] the help of the US Department of Justice to compel the US
providers to turn over evidence even if the crime being investigated is
wholly domestic.” 192 The bill then lays out the procedures for creating
executive agreements while also answering the question of how a
foreign country can become a “qualifying foreign government,” which
is a required condition for a provider to object to disclosing
information, by filing a motion to quash or modify under the first part
of the bill. 193 To become a qualifying foreign government, a foreign
country must adhere to certain international human rights standards and
have sufficient substantive and procedural protections for accessing
data, including minimization procedures for the “dissemination of
information concerning U.S. persons.” 194 Additionally, the foreign
government is prohibited from intentionally targeting a US person or a
person located in the United States either directly or indirectly. 195 Once
the US Attorney General makes a determination about whether to enter
into an executive agreement with a country, that decision is not subject
to any kind of judicial or administrative review. 196
Microsoft and other technology companies have endorsed the
CLOUD Act because they believe it balances differing interests of law
through whether to issue an order with extraterritorial impact. Its presence in the statute is
perhaps a reminder that trust and mutual respect play an important role in these cross-border
matters.”). But see Jennifer Daskal, New Bill Would Moot Microsoft Ireland Case—And Much
More!, JUST SECURITY (Feb 6, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/51886/bill-moot-microsoftireland-case-more/ [https://perma.cc/5GZL-WDTS] (The bill “explicitly preserves, via a rule of
construction, the availability of common law comity claims in situations involving nonqualifying countries. . . . It thus preserves the availability of providers to raise comity claims
even in situations where there is not explicit statutory authority to do so––and move to quash
based on the fact that the execution of warrant will generate a conflict of laws.”).
191. CLOUD Act § 4.
192. Alex Grigsby, The Intelligence Collection Implications of the CLOUD Act, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BLOG POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/intelligencecollection-implications-cloud-act [https://perma.cc/Q7AB-MHS2].
193. CLOUD Act § 3(b).
194. CLOUD Act § 5(a).
195. Id.
196. Id.

212

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:1

enforcement, customer privacy, and “gives the technology sector two
distinct statutory rights to protect consumers and resolve conflicts of
law,” which include “mechanisms to notify foreign governments when
a legal request implicates their residents, and to initiate a direct legal
challenge when necessary.” 197
Opponents of the CLOUD Act, largely consisting of privacy and
human rights organizations, 198 are primarily concerned about the
effects of diminished privacy and the potential for abuse. 199 Camille
Fischer, a former Obama administration policy advisor and current
Electronic Frontier Foundation fellow, was concerned about the fact
that “the bill would allow the President to enter into ‘executive
agreements’ with foreign governments that would allow each
government to acquire users’ data stored in the other country, without
following each other’s privacy laws.” 200 These concerns are for the
privacy interests of people the bill does not explicitly protect—people
who are not US persons or persons located in the United States. 201 A
government win in Microsoft would have afforded zero protection to
any person, regardless of nationality, because the interpretation would
have centered around the custody and control of the sought-after
data. 202 At least with the CLOUD Act, U.S. citizens are afforded a
stronger guarantee of privacy than could previously have been the case.

197. Company Letter of Support, supra note 181.
198. Neema Singh Guliani, The Cloud Act Is a Dangerous Piece of Legislation, ACLU
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/print/node/67581 [https://perma.cc/9RYE-5ZSC].
199. See Camille Fischer, The CLOUD Act: A Dangerous Expansion of Police Snooping
on Cross-Border Data, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2018/02/cloud-act-dangerous-expansion-police-snooping-cross-border-data
[https://perma.cc/P64V-83NH]; Derek B. Johnson, New CLOUD Act splits industry, civil liberty
orgs,
FCW
(Feb.
9,
2018),
https://fcw.com/articles/2018/02/09/cloud-act.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SD54-K66N].
200. Fischer, supra note 199.
201. Id. See Johnson, supra note 199 (“The Center for Democracy and Technology, a think
tank focused on Internet freedom issues, also has come out against the legislation, arguing the
new version would allow the Department of Justice to authorize foreign governments to demand
wiretaps on U.S. companies absent a warrant.”); Grigsby, supra note 192 (“Although the bill
ostensibly aims to help foreign countries obtain data to investigate local crimes, it could also
make it easier for them to collect data from U.S. providers for intelligence purposes on targets
anywhere in the world.”).
202. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, 31, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186
(2017) (No. 17-2).
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Opponents also find that the bill does not afford sufficient Fourth
Amendment protections. 203 Specifically, the language in the statute is
too vague, as it “provides only factors, not requirements, for approval
and is written so broadly as to be open to interpretation.” 204 Because
the standard is worded somewhat ambiguously, this gives the U.S.
government more discretion in its decisions and will likely result in less
transparency or accountability, especially considering the lack of
judicial review. 205 The concerns about transparency are well founded
and Congress should consider amending the CLOUD Act.
The ACLU also calls the bill a threat to “global activists.” 206 They
state that, under the current standard, activists’ information abroad is
“protected from being disclosed by U.S. companies to governments
who may seek to do them harm.” 207 However, the CLOUD Act would
“eliminate[] many of these protections and replace[] them with vague
assurances, weak standards, and largely unenforceable restrictions.”208
Although the Attorney General must consider the enumerated factors,
“he is not prohibited from entering into an agreement with a country
that has committed human rights abuses.” 209 Even Daskal, a proponent
of the CLOUD Act, agrees that the executive agreement approval
process could be strengthened and also made transparent, and possibly
subject to some third party oversight. 210

203. See David Ruiz, A New backdoor around the Fourth Amendment: The CLOUD Act,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/newbackdoor-around-fourth-amendment-cloud-act [https://perma.cc/VGS4-42YE] (arguing that
foreign law enforcement will be able to collect Americans’ communications and share them with
the U.S. government under the vaguely worded ‘significant harm’ test and that the U.S.
government may use this information against Americans without first obtaining probable cause
or a search warrant); Fischer, supra note 199; Grigsby, supra note 192.
204. Drew Mitnick, A diagnosis: Why current proposals to fix the MLAT system won’t
work, ACCESS NOW (May 2, 2017) (emphasis added), https://www.accessnow.org/diagnosiscurrent-proposals-fix-mlat-system-wont-work/ [https://perma.cc/6SJK-C6SP]. See CLOUD Act
§ 105(a) (setting out the “factors to be considered” by the executive branch in determining
whether to enter into an executive agreement).
205. See Mitnick, supra note 204.
206. Guliani, supra note 198.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.; see Ruiz, supra note 203.
210. Jennifer Daskal & Peter Swire, Why the CLOUD Act is Good for Privacy and Human
Rights, LAWFARE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://lawfareblog.com/why-cloud-act-good-privacy-andhuman-rights [https://perma.cc/XW44-RCE7].
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The CLOUD Act was rightfully enacted before the Supreme
Court ruled on the matter. Congress was correct to adopt this legislation
because it addresses the contested issue in Microsoft and appears to
adequately balance the competing interests involved. The unamended
version of the SCA was wholly insufficient to deal with the
technological realities of today. However, certain parts of the CLOUD
Act should be modified. The CLOUD Act should be subject to four
main changes.
First, transparency should be required in creating executive
agreements with regard to the CLOUD Act. Currently, the executive
agreements within the CLOUD Act are “not [] subject to judicial or
administrative review,” 211 but Congress can still check the executive.
The Attorney General must notify Congress within seven days of
certifying an executive agreement. 212 Then, the agreement enters into
force no earlier than 180 days after notice, unless Congress enacts a
joint resolution of disapproval. 213 Such a check on the executive
agreement only appears to rest with Congress as there is no provision
requiring the exact terms of the agreement to be disclosed. One
commentator of the CLOUD Act, Greg Nojeim, pointed out concerns
about such lack of transparency because the Justice Department has not
disclosed the contents of a draft agreement with the United Kingdom
made before the CLOUD Act, nor has it disclosed which countries have
approached the United States about entering into such agreements.214
Although the government’s actions in these examples may be
predictive, they are not determinative of what the government will
actually do when a final agreement is reached. These concerns focus
on the negotiating stages of such executive agreements. However, until
the first CLOUD Act executive agreement is reached, the government’s
position on the transparency of the details of the agreement is
speculative.

211. CLOUD Act § 105(c).
212. CLOUD Act § 105(d).
213. CLOUD Act § 105(d). A joint resolution of disapproval can be introduced in either
the House of Representatives or the Senate. CLOUD Act § 105(d). It also requires approval by
both houses of Congress and by the President or else both houses must override a presidential
veto. See 7 Deschler’s Precedents of the United States House of Representatives 4791 (1994).
214. Greg Nojeim, Cloud Act Implementation Issues, LAWFARE (July 10, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/cloud-act-implementation-issues
[https://perma.cc/Y9HYR5GF].
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Transparency acts as a check on the executive branch, ensuring
that its decisions are thoroughly and thoughtfully considered.215
Similar to how courts issue opinions, a determination about an
executive agreement can be reported and explained. 216 This way,
decisions are subject to public and media scrutiny. Additionally, if an
applicant country is denied, that country is given an explanation and, if
it so desires, may make certain changes to be in compliance for a
subsequent application. Transparency will also ensure that decisions
are not based on unrelated political factors, such as an historically good
or bad relationship with a certain country or political retaliation or
advantage, among other reasons. Determinations about executive
agreements should focus on the factors listed in the CLOUD Act and
avoid being overly influenced by politics.
If the executive branch enters into an agreement with a country
that commits human rights abuses, there should be some recourse for
targets of CLOUD Act warrants or disclosure requests by foreign
nations. 217 Executive agreements that are publicly available may also
be used by targets of a CLOUD Act warrant or disclosure request by a
foreign nation to challenge whether there is an applicable executive
agreement. Such valid challenges could not effectively take place
without knowing the contents of the applicable executive agreement, if
one exists.
Secondly, under the current CLOUD Act, providers are not
required to disclose the existence of legal process to a foreign
government. 218 Specifically, providers are not in violation of the Act if
they “disclose to the entity within a qualifying foreign government . . .

215. See WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42817, GOVERNMENT
TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY: AN EXAMINATION OF MEANING AND ITS USE IN THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 30 (2012) (quoting OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES:
OPEN GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE 1 (2009)).
216. The executive branch must submit a written certification to Congress explaining how
the requirements for an executive agreement have been met. CLOUD Act § 105(d). However,
there is no requirement that certification be public.
217. The earlier version of the CLOUD Act listed human rights criteria as certain “factors
to be considered,” whereas the enacted version states them as “factors to be met.” Sharon
Bradford Franklin, The Forecast Is Still Cloudy, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2018, 3:36 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/03/the-cloud-act-could-hurt-human-rights-around-theworld.html [https://perma.cc/MK64-XSZM] (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. CLOUD Act § 103(h)(5).
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the fact of the existence of legal process.” 219 Instead of giving providers
the discretion of whether or not to disclose, the Act should instead
require such disclosure to an appropriate authority of every
government, qualifying or non-qualifying. An appropriate authority
would likely be the equivalent of the US Department of Justice. This
aids in transparency and provides more trust between the United States
and other governments. Additionally, such a requirement would
necessarily come with a punishment for providers that do not disclose.
Since the purpose is not to punish providers, but rather to ensure
transparency, such a punishment could consist of a fine.
Third, there should be an additional section updating the MLAT
process for non-qualifying countries. If no executive agreement exists,
then such countries are left with the old MLAT process that remains
slow and not universal. 220 As the CLOUD Act currently stands, it
appears to disregard the preferred policies of other countries solely
based on whether or not an executive agreement with the United States
exists. 221 The qualifying/non-qualifying distinction should remain, but
there should still be some sort of recourse for countries without an
executive agreement that have a valid interest and objection to the legal
process. Thus, although a provider is not required to file a motion to
quash or modify, the provider would be required to notify both
qualifying and non-qualifying foreign governments of the legal
process, under the second proposed change. With that notification, the
non-qualifying country itself could file an objection or a motion to
suspend until the MLAT process has been fully carried out.
Finally, the CLOUD Act currently only allows a court to modify
or quash legal process if it finds that three conditions are fully met.222
The first condition is that the “required disclosure would cause the
provider to violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government.” 223 The
second condition allows modification if, “based on the totality of the
circumstances, the interests of justice dictate that legal process should
be modified or quashed” after conducting the comity analysis. 224 The
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
221. Only a provider may file a motion to quash or modify and the filing of this motion is
conditioned upon there being a material risk that the required disclosure would cause the
provider to violate the laws of a “qualifying foreign government.” CLOUD Act § 103(a)(1).
222. CLOUD Act § 103(a)(2)(b).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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third and final condition is that “the customer or subscriber is not a
United States person and does not reside in the United States.” 225
Considering the second and third recommended modifications
regarding notification to all countries and allowing non-qualifying
countries to make an objection, the conditions about when a court may
modify or quash legal process should also be adjusted. The second and
third conditions for quashing legal process may be left the same.
However, the problem with the first condition is that, at least initially,
not many countries will have an executive agreement with the United
States, and, thus, it would be impossible to modify or quash any legal
process if that non-qualifying country is involved. Another issue with
this condition is that a legal process may not necessarily violate the
laws of another country, but it could cause outrage that may incite that
country’s government to retaliate with data localization laws.
Preventing data localization is in the interest of both law enforcement
and a provider and should consequently be of the utmost importance.
Instead of being a required condition, the first factor that the
“required disclosure would cause the provider to violate the laws of a
qualifying foreign government” should be an optional finding. 226 Also,
an additional optional finding should be that a non-qualifying country
has submitted a valid MLAT request (under a revised MLAT system),
and in that case, the court may also suspend the order temporarily,
pending the completion of the revised MLAT process. Such a reading
would give a judge more discretion in deciding such motions, also
helping to balance the executive branch’s power to enter into executive
agreements and thereby dictate which countries are “qualifying” as
well as to respect other countries’ rules of law. 227
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the enactment of the CLOUD Act, the SCA was incapable
of adequately addressing all of the competing interests that were at play
in Microsoft. The CLOUD Act is a solution that takes into account the
technological reality of today that is increasingly transcending physical
borders. It is a legislative attempt to appease law enforcement,
providers, users, and foreign nations. For now, it provides a solid

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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foundation, and with certain modifications, it could be a promising
solution.

